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Abstract. M2M devices are ubiquitous, and there is a growing ten-
dency to connect such devices to mobile networks. Network operators
are investigating new solutions to lower their costs and to address us-
ability issues. Embedded SIM cards with remote provisioning capability
are one of the most promising solutions. GSMA, the leading consortium
on mobile network standards, has proposed a specification for such an
embedded SIM card, called eUICC. The specification describes eUICC
architecture and a remote provisioning mechanism. Embodiments of this
specification have the potential to disrupt the telecommunications mar-
ket: eUICCs will be shipped to device manufacturers and then remotely
provisioned with a subscription, whereas (currently) SIMs must be pro-
visioned prior to shipping. In this article, we present a comprehensive
overview of GSMA’s specification and its motivation. In particular, we
describe the technology and the protocols involved in remote provision-
ing.
1 Introduction
Machine to Machine (M2M) devices communicate without human intervention.
They are ubiquitous and have diverse applications, ranging from smart (e.g.,
smart-watches, -meters, and -cars) and medical devices, to ATMs and vending
machines, for instance. A growing number of devices communicate over cellular
networks [13], relying on infrastructures owned by Mobile Network Operators
(MNOs), who restrict network access to subscribers.
To receive service, M2M devices authenticate to MNOs, using an authenti-
cated key-exchange protocol. For 3G and 4G networks, the Authentication and
Key Agreement protocol (AKA) [1] is used,which allows a secure, over-the-air
channel to be established between the device and the network. This is achieved
using several cryptographic algorithms, a unique identifier (for each subscriber),
and a symmetric key.
Historically, M2M devices have used dedicated smart cards, called Subscriber
Identity Modules (SIMs), to store the secrets needed to authenticate to and
access operators’ networks. The SIMs used by M2M devices to access cellular
networks are specified by the European Telecommunication Standards Institute
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(ETSI). They are known as Machine Form Factor (MFF2) SIMs [2] and are
distributed using the following linear chain (illustrated in Figure 1):
1. MFF2 SIM cards are fabricated by manufacturers and shipped to MNOs.
2. MNOs personalize MFF2 SIMs by installing subscription data over a physi-
cal connection. (Subscription data refers to data and applications necessary
to allow a device to connect and use a network, including a symmetric key,
network parameters, a network access application (NAA), and an implemen-
tation of AKA.)1
3. Personalized MFF2 SIMs are issued to M2M device manufacturers.
4. Device manufacturers embed MFF2 SIMs inside devices. (In Figure 1, the
wireless logo appears on top of the M2M device to illustrate that the device
has a subscription.)
Devices are then shipped to the relevant distributors, wholesalers, and retailers.
M2M Manufacturer M2M Device
MNO
2
31 4MFF2 SIM
Manufacturer
Fig. 1: MFF2 SIM linear distribution & subscription model.
MFF2 SIMs suffer shortcomings including the following:
– Subscription data must be installed using a physical channel, which increases
costs and lead times.
– MFF2 SIMs can only support a single subscription from a single MNO.
Hence, a product intervention is required to change a subscription, which
is costly for MNOs [10, p.13] and manufacturers, especially for devices in
remote, inaccessible locations, e.g., underwater sensors used by offshore oil
platforms.
– Changing MFF2 SIMs is often a difficult operation, because to do so devices
must typically be unsealed. Indeed, most remote M2M devices are sealed,
either to prevent theft, or to protect its components when the device is
operating in harsh environmental conditions.
Stakeholders are seeking new technologies to solve these shortcomings.
ETSI and GSMA are investigating remotely re-programmable SIMs to ad-
dress shortcomings. The first specification for a remotely re-programmable SIM
1 Alternatively, personalization is often done by the MFF2 manufacturer who ships
SIM cards to MNOs along with the SIMs personalization information.
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was proposed by ETSI in working document TS 103.383 [4]. This specification
introduces an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) and the
core requirements to enable remote provisioning. GSMA have extended that
specification [9], and have also released supporting documents [8], providing use
cases and test cases for such an eUICC. GSMA’s specification has “received
strong industry support” from several key operators, including AT&T, Deutsche
Telekom, Orange, and Vodafone.
Contribution and motivation. This article introduces and explains GSMA’s
“Remote Provisioning Architecture for Embedded UICC” specification [9], with
a focus on the smart card architecture, and on the remote provisioning mecha-
nisms. Our work aims at facilitating the understanding of GSMA’s specification
by presenting a comprehensive overview of GSMA’s specification, and of their
M2M specification. GSMA’s specification for eUICCs is marketed and consid-
ered by many operators and device manufacturers as the leading proposition
for the next SIM technology that makes an attempt to meet the requirements
for both remote provisioning and re-programmability of the SIM. As such, we
believe it is of paramount importance to explain GSMA’s specification and the
motivations behind it. As part of our contribution, we present detailed visuals
of eUICCs and their environment.
Structure. We illustrate the changes to the SIM distribution and subscription
model (Section 2), describe the newly proposed ecosystem for M2M devices (Sec-
tion 3), and present the eUICC architecture (Section 4). Moreover, we explain
the core functions and mechanisms behind remote provisioning (Section 5), and
close with a brief conclusion (Section 6). (For reference, a list of abbreviations
appears towards the end of this article.)
2 eUICC distribution chain and subscription model
Remote provisioning allows consumers to buy M2M devices before subscribing
to an MNO. This leads to an evolution of the linear distribution model (used
by SIMs), since distribution and subscription can be separated. To instantiate
remote provisioning, GSMA introduces a Subscription Manager (SM), which
acts as an intermediary between MNOs and eUICCs. This removes MNOs from
distribution and results in a new chain, described as follows (and which we
illustrate in Figure 2 (a)):
1. eUICCs are fabricated by eUICC Manufacturers (EUMs).
2. EUMs create an eUICC Information Set (EIS) file for each eUICC describing
their characteristics,2 and send the file to the SM.
3. eUICCs are shipped to M2M device manufacturers.
4. M2M device manufacturers embed eUICCs inside devices.
2 These are permanent characteristics, such as the EUM identity or the eUICC pro-
duction date signed by the EUM.
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As before, devices are shipped to the relevant distributors, wholesalers, and
retailers.
Device Manufacturer Device
SM
1
2
3
4
EUM
(a) Distribution chain
1
Device
6
SM
5
MNO
(b) Subscription model
Fig. 2: eUICC distribution chain & subscription model
The eUICC distribution chain reduces production costs for EUMs and for
M2M manufacturers. Indeed, as MNOs are removed from the distribution chain,
eUICCs are manufactured without subscription and can be shipped directly to
device manufacturers who can embed the eUICC. Furthermore, eUICCs can be
embedded deep inside devices as they will be remotely managed. MNO costs
are also reduced, as they need not ship SIMs to device manufacturers. Finally,
eUICCs need not be personalized over a physical channel.
The new distribution chain leads to a new subscription model, whereby sub-
scriptions are purchased as follows (and which we illustrate in Figure 2 (b)):
5. The owner of a M2M device subscribes to an MNO and the MNO sends a
request to download the related subscription to the SM.
6. The SM writes subscription data corresponding to the MNO to the eUICC
application, called a Profile, and remotely installs this profile on the eUICC
present in the M2M device.
It follows that devices and subscriptions can be purchased separately, benefiting
buyers who can independently leverage the device and subscription markets.
We next describe eUICCs and the mechanisms behind remote provisioning
as well as the associated protocols.
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3 eUICC architecture
MFF2 SIMs are compatible with GlobalPlatform’s3 smart card specification
standard [7].4 This standard specifies a general architecture for multi-application
platforms, application lifecycle, platform management, and input-output chan-
nels between the card and external entities. In order to ease transition from
MFF2 SIMs to eUICCs and for backward compatibility, eUICCs are also com-
pliant with GlobalPlatform’s standard.
It follows that eUICCs build upon the architecture of GlobalPlatform-compliant
smart cards. As such, eUICCs contain a runtime environment, a framework
(called OPEN) that interacts with different applications and Security Domains,
i.e., privileged applications that act as on-card representatives of off-card au-
thorities and that can establish secure channels and handle some management
functions. Each application, including security domains, depends on a parent
(or master) application. This association permits parent-child communication,
while other communication requires authorization from the parent. Messages re-
ceived and processed by the eUICC respect the Application Protocol Data Unit
(APDU) format specified by GlobalPlatform standard.
Compared to MFF2 SIMs that are tied to a single subscription, the eUICC
architecture can support several operators simultaneously. Each operator con-
trols a profile on the eUICC. This profile is organised as an MFF2 SIM, i.e., the
logical file system and internal application of an MFF2 SIM are preserved in the
profile. The organisation of an eUICC, which we illustrate in Figure 3, is now
described.
As discussed in Section 2, eUICCs are manufactured and shipped to the
device manufacturer without subscriptions. Some components and applications
are installed at manufacture, while some are installed later on, relying on re-
mote provisioning. Freshly shipped eUICCs only contain the following elements
(components represented with solid lines in Figure 3):
– An interface, the ISD-R, for over-the-air communication with the subscrip-
tion manager.
The Issuer Security Domain Root (ISD-R) provides an on-card communi-
cation interface accessible by the subscription manager. The ISD-R is the
highest privileged security domain on the eUICC, and, as such, has man-
agement capabilities over all other eUICC applications, including security
domains. Remote commands sent to eUICCs are received and processed by
the ISD-R, and then relayed to the targeted application, such as a profile.
The ISD-R is equipped with a symmetric key during eUICC’s manufacture
for establishing a secure communication channel with the subscription man-
ager.
– A Controlling Authority, the ECASD.
3 GlobalPlatform is a consortium maintaining multi-application smart card standards.
4 Markantonakis and Mayes present an overview of GlobalPlatform’s smart card spec-
ification [14]
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Fig. 3: eUICC Architecture Overview. Solid boxes represent components installed
during manufacture while dashed boxes represent components installed with re-
mote provisioning. Lines represent the hierarchical association between compo-
nents.
The eUICC Controlling Authority Security Domain (ECASD) is responsi-
ble for authenticating remote parties using a public key infrastructure. To
achieve authentication, the ECASD holds cryptographic data, including the
public key of the certificate authority. The ECASD also holds the private
key of the eUICC used to set up a secure channel (see Section 5). The eUICC
public key is stored in the EIS file stored by the subscription manager (see
Section 2).
– A communication application to enable initial remote management of the
eUICC.
The fabrication process of eUICCs includes granting them with minimal
connectivity services to allow remote provisioning of MNO’s profiles on the
eUICC thereafter. For this purpose, a provisioning profile (i.e., a profile
containing an NAA set with minimal connectivity capabilities) is installed.
Once embedded inside a device, eUICCs are remotely provisioned with op-
erational profiles (i.e., a profile containing subscription data corresponding to
an MNO). eUICCs support many operational profiles throughout their lifetime.
Remote provisioning enables installation, management and deletion of those pro-
files. Each profile is dependent on a dedicated security domain called an Issuer
Security Domain Profile (ISD-P). ISD-Ps are created by the ISD-R, which, de-
spite management capabilities, is unable to modify their profile content, which
should guarantee integrity of the operators’ data stored in profiles. By using ded-
icated ISD-Ps, profile data can only be accessed with the ISD-R’s authorization,
and is, as such, isolated from other profiles.
6
4 Remote provisioning ecosystem
In their specification, GSMA describe various communication channels between
eUICCs and external entities (represented in Figure 4). As communications be-
tween entities and the eUICC are wireless, GSMA has chosen to rely on certifi-
cates for authentication. Thus, each entity involved in the remote provisioning
framework is certified by an authority referred to as the CI in GSMA’s specifi-
cation.
eUICC
MNO
SM-DP SM-SR ISD-R
ECASD
ISD-P
PMNO
1 (*)(*)
(*)
Main eUICC over the air channel
eUICC intra communication using GlobalPlatform Open framework
MNO, SM-DP and SM-SR communications for eUICC management
MNO access to its profile for connectivity parameters and Policy updates
Entity certified by an authority
(*) Message respecting the Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) format
Fig. 4: eUICC remote provisioning interfaces and communication channels
In addition to remote provisioning and re-programmability, the eUICC ar-
chitecture allows several profiles (each being an application containing the sub-
scription data of an MFF2 SIM), owned by different MNOs, to coexist on the
same card during their lifetime. This improvement eases the embedding of eU-
ICCs inside devices during manufacture. By comparison, MFF2 SIM cards are
restricted to a single SIM application, owned by a single MNO. Due to this dis-
tinction, the role of the MNO for eUICCs compared to its role for MFF2 SIMs
is revised, in particular, the management of eUICCs is pushed from MNOs to
the subscription manager described in the following paragraph.
Subscription manager. The subscription manager’s duties are split between
two sub-entities: the Subscription Manager - Data Preparation (SM-DP) and
the Subscription Manager - Secure Routing (SM-SR) (introduced in Section 2).
– The SM-DP is responsible for generating profiles containing an operator’s
subscription data, and for transferring such profiles onto the eUICC.5
– SM-SRs are the main entity communicating with eUICCs. They remotely
manage eUICCs using an eUICC’s ISD-R interface. All remote communica-
tion is secured through the secure channel that the SM-SR set up with the
ISD-R.
5 GSMA suggests that an MNO can also assume the role of a DP or can own a DP [8].
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Secure Channels. To ensure confidentiality of messages exchanged, secure chan-
nels are used for communication between the eUICC and an external entity. In
order to achieve message confidentiality and maintain those secure channels,
remote provisioning relies on protocols defined by ETSI [3, 5], in particular,
the Secure Channel Protocol 80 (SCP80). This includes communication between
the SM-DP and the ISD-P during profile installation (see Section 5), but also
communication between an MNO and its profile (as represented in Figure 4).
However it is important to note that the mentioned secure channels are built
upon the secure channel between the ISD-R and the SM-SR.
SM-SR handover. Similarly to MFF2 SIMs that are managed by a single MNO,
eUICCs are managed by a single SM-SR, albeit, the SM-SR may change over
time. EUM send an eUICC’s data to the first SM-SR responsible for that eUICC.
This data includes the EIS file and the secret key needed to communicate with
the eUICC. After that, MNOs might request a change of the SM-SR responsible
for an eUICC when a change of subscription occurs from one MNO to another.
GSMA’s specification describes the different communication channels and mes-
sages sent between the eUICC and its ecosystem, as depicted in Figure 4. The
specification also outlines the profile life cycle induced by the remote provisioning
protocols, which we will describe next.
5 Profile lifecycle
Upon receipt of an eUICC equipped device, a customer can subscribe to an MNO.
To enable the contracted services, the MNO must upload a profile6 corresponding
to the subscription made onto eUICCs. The upload and installation of a profile
on an eUICC is as follows:
1. The MNO prepares a profile description containing the profile type and
eUICC identifier (EID), and sends the description to the SM-DP within a
DownloadProfile request.
2. The SM-DP creates a profile corresponding to the request and containing
the subscription data of the operator, then requests the creation of an ISD-P
to the SM-SR.
3. The SM-SR instructs the ISD-R to create a new ISD-P capable of managing
the profile created.
4. The SM-DP derives a secret key k from a shared secret s with the ISD-P. The
secret s is obtained by following the Elliptic Curve Key Agreement (ECKA)
protocol based on ElGamal [6].
5. After that, the profile, created by the SM-DP, is sent by the SM-DP to the
eUICC over a secure channel set up using k (see Section 4).
6. Finally, the profile is uploaded by the SM-DP onto the eUICC.
6 In GSMA’s specification, this profile is referred to as an operational profile, to dif-
ferentiate it from a provisioning profile.
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7. The ISD-P decrypts the profile using k and installs the profile.
Installed profiles are initially disabled and may subsequently be enabled or
deleted. To manage profiles, GSMA’s specification defines a set of policy rules,
POL1, that are stored in a file inside each profile. Policy rules are instantiated by
MNOs during profile creation and can be updated remotely by the MNO for the
enabled profile only. For this purpose, MNOs can set up a secure channel with
the profile using a security domain, the MNO-SD, present in the profile. To ease
profile management, an unsynchronized version of those rules are maintained
by the MNO in the EIS file (held by the SM-SR). Policy rules determine if a
profile can be disabled, deleted or must be deleted once it is disabled. To ensure
exclusivity, operators can lock devices to their profile. Indeed policy rules can
prevent the change of a subscription by locking the device to the enabled profile
– similarly to the SIM lock feature of mobile phones. M2M devices can only
access the network with the profile that is enabled.
GSMA, in order to increase the reliability of eUICCs connectivity, also in-
troduces another attribute for the profiles: the fallback attribute. This Boolean
attribute can only be set to true on a single disabled profile which is enabled to
prevent connection loss or errors.
GSMA choses to rely on profiles to improve over MFF2 SIMs, their lifecy-
cle enabling re-programmability support remote provisioning. Furthermore the
format of a profile eases the isolation of sensitive data ensuring the security
requirements of the different stakeholders.
6 Closing remarks
The MFF2 form factor requires M2M SIMs be embedded inside devices. This
presents some shortcomings, especially as such SIMs support only a single sub-
scription that must be physically uploaded. New technologies have been explored
to overcome these shortcomings. In particular, GSMA has released a specifica-
tion describing mechanisms for remote provisioning, and their application to the
management of a new SIM, called an eUICC, that is re-programmable. eUICCs
can be embedded in M2M devices during manufacture, and need not be replaced
upon a consumer changing subscriptions.
This article presents the motivation behind eUICC and remote provisioning,
and the changes they will induce upon the telecommunication ecosystem. It also
describes the technical challenges of remote provisioning and illustrates GSMA’s
solution.
eUICC is being driven towards standardization. If eUICCs are adopted widely
as the next generation SIMs for M2M devices, then, operators, device manufac-
turers and SIM manufacturers will have to adapt to the new eUICCs ecosystem.
The evolution towards next generation telecommunications is exciting, but not
without risk; flawed systems have the potential to cost society dearly, in terms
of both lost liberties and financial costs. As such, similarly to the security anal-
ysis done by Meyer et al. in [15], it will be important to analyze in detail the
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mechanisms behind remote provisioning to be sure that the properties offered
by the current model will hold for eUICCs, especially in term of security as it is
paramount for operators. Such an overview is helping in that regard by easing
the comprehension of those technical specification. Furthermore eUICCs are also
likely to be considered as the next generation SIM for all devices, in particular
Internet of Things devices considered as potential M2M devices [12] and mobile
phones already marketed as an eSIM by GSMA [11]. This represents a very im-
portant market, this is why it is crucial to look at the impact that eUICCs and
remote provisioning can have, both in terms of changes to the network and to
consumer habits.
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